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I. INTRODUCTION
It is widely recognized that there is a substantial divergence between the "standards of conduct" that are purportedly imposed upon
corporate officers and directors by state corporation law and the "standards of review" by which the courts actually assess compliance or
noncompliance with those standards of conduct when behavior is challenged.1 This is particularly apparent in the fiduciary duty of care
context, where the prevailing standard of conduct across the various
state jurisdictions is the negligence criterion,2 while the standard of
©
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Professor of Law, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and
Standards of Review in CorporateLaw, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993).
2. Melvin A. Eisenberg, CorporateLaw and Social Norms, 99 CoLuM. L. REv. 1253,
1269 (1999)("For example, in the area of duty of care the standard of conduct is
*
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review that is actually applied embodies deferential business judgment rule principles, 3 essentially providing a much more forgiving
gross negligence criterion.
The existence of such a pronounced rift between the articulated
standards of conduct and the standards of review that are actually
applied by the courts is, at first regard, quite puzzling. It does not
appear to make sense regardless of one's personal views concerning
the nature of fiduciary duties. One may, for example, favor holding
corporate officials to the negligence standard that is widely applied
elsewhere in society. Alternatively, strong arguments can be made
that the special circumstances of corporate decision-making justify applying a more deferential gross negligence standard. 4 But what possible justification could there be for the courts to declare that the
applicable standard of conduct is the negligence criterion-thereby
sending the message that this fairly stringent criterion is not merely
an aspirational, legally unenforceable social norm, but is the law-and
then to actually apply a more deferential gross negligence criterion
whenever that conduct is challenged? Such a divergence between the
law as articulated and as actually applied is unusual in our legal system, and is generally condemned when it is recognized. It would seem
to be a sure recipe for creating confusion and misunderstanding, both
among the persons subject to or protected by the conflicting standards
and the courts that must apply those standards.
This divergence in duty of care law between the articulated negligence standard of conduct and the gross negligence standard of review
has long mystified scholars, judges, and lawyers, and of course also
tormented them in their earlier incarnations as law students. 5 Many
knowledgeable observers have recognized that there are good reasons
why the courts should make it rather difficult (though possible) to successfully sue corporate directors and officers for duty of care violations, and why applying a gross negligence standard through the
mechanism of a procedure-oriented business judgment rule review
may be the most feasible means to accomplish this end. 6 But, if gross
negligence is the appropriate legal standard, what purpose is served
by the language in judicial opinions and statutory preambles that an'act reasonably'. .. ").
3. Id. ("[T]he standard of review is often the much looser business judgment standard of rationality.").
4. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs, & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Realigning the
Standard of Review of DirectorDue Care with DelawarePublic Policy: A Critique
of Van Gorkum and its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 Nw. U. L.
REV. 449 (2002).
5. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the
Behavioral Foundations of CorporateLaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1743, 1743
n.12 (2001).
6. See, e.g., Allen, Jacobs, and Strine, supra note 4.
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nounces to corporate directors, officers, shareholders, and judges that
the "standard of conduct" imposed upon those corporate officials is
higher?
Now, I recognize that a rousing good sermon can be morally uplifting, and may even influence some members of the congregation to
behave better. No real harm would be done, and perhaps even some
benefits obtained, by including in dicta moral exhortations to corporate officials to aspire to behave more responsibly than the bare legal
minimum standards of acceptable conduct. That is, so long as it is
made quite clear that these exhortations represent aspirational norms
rather than legally enforceable duties. But when such exhortations
are presented in the guise of law-like "standards of conduct" obvious
potential for confusion and misunderstanding as to the nature of the
applicable law is created; the line where the moral exhortations end
and the enforceable legal standards begin is blurred. Such a conflation of legal standards and moral aspirations seems unwise in a legal
system broadly committed to the basic rule of law principle that persons should be given clear advance notice of the legally enforceable
limitations on their conduct, and on the conduct of persons who may
serve as their agents. How can this divergence between standards of
conduct and standards of review possibly be justified? This Article
will examine the arguments that have been made in support of maintaining a divergence between standards of conduct and review, with
particular emphasis on their application to the corporate fiduciary
duty of care context. I will conclude that these arguments are unpersuasive, and that society would be better served if the standards of
conduct and review in corporate law were brought into much closer
alignment. In my opinion, for each different context in which duty of
care issues arise, only a single standard is called for, which both defines the scope of permissible conduct in that context and guides judicial application of that standard. Such a single standard is consistent
with our general legal practice. I personally would favor application of
the gross negligence/business judgment rule "standard of review"
rather than the negligence "standard of conduct," but my main point
is, that regardless of the particular criterion used, a single, clearly articulated standard is preferable to the current conflation of legal standards with moral exhortations.
II.

A.

ASSESSING THE ARGUMENT FOR MAINTAINING
DIVERGENT STANDARDS FOR THE CORPORATE
FIDUCIARY DUTY OF CARE

The Limited Body of Scholarship Justifying Divergent
Standards in the Corporate Law Context

One would expect that such a jurisprudential anomaly in a socially
important body of law would have long been subjected to harsh and

674
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sustained criticism, and could only have endured if convincing justification had been offered in rebuttal. It was with some surprise that I
discovered that the body of scholarship that argues for maintaining
divergent standards is quite limited in quantity and scope, and the
branch of that literature that addresses the corporate fiduciary duty of
care context is very sparse and relatively unpersuasive.
By far the most significant article in the legal literature that discusses and attempts to justify divergent standards of conduct and review was written in 1983 by Meir Dan-Cohen.7 The author explicitly
limited his arguments to the criminal law context. The article triggered a comprehensive response by Richard Singer that was published
two years later.8 In addition, a couple of other writers later applied
Dan-Cohen's concepts and arguments in some detail to environmental
law9 and contract law,'O respectively. The Dan-Cohen piece is regularly cited for some of its more interesting propositions.11
I am only aware of two articles that have attempted to build upon
Dan-Cohen's work in order to assess the desirability of having divergent standards in the corporate fiduciary duty of care context. One of
these articles was published in 1984 by David Phillips,12 and the other
in 1993 by Melvin Eisenberg. 13 There are a number of other articles
that briefly note the existence of this divergence in the corporate fiduciary duty of care context. 14 A few of these articles make reference to
the Dan-Cohen and/or Eisenberg articles noted above as providing
some intellectual justification for maintaining this divergence.15
However, the Phillips and Eisenberg pieces are the only efforts of
which I am aware that go beyond merely recognizing the existence of
this divergence in the corporate law context, or simply noting that
other writers have offered a justification for its persistence, and at7. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separationin
Criminal Law, 97 HARv. L. REV. 625 (1984).
8. Richard Singer, On Classism and Dissonance in the Criminal Law: A Reply to
Professor Meir Dan-Cohen, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 69 (1986).
9. Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 495 (1986).
10. Emily L. Sherwin, Law and Equity in ContractEnforcement, 50 MD. L. REV. 253
(1991).
11. A Lexis search of "law reviews" conducted on March 2, 2003 using the search
phrase "Dan-Cohen and decision rules" identified 161 citations.
12. David M. Phillips, Principlesof Corporate Governance:A Critique of Part IV, 52
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 653 (1984) (appearing in the Symposium, American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project: in the Duty of Care section).
13. Eisenberg, supra note 1.
14. See, e.g., Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 4, at 451; Edward B. Rock & Michael
L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing
Corporation,149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1643 (2001); D. Gordon Smith, A Proposal
to Eliminate DirectorStandardsfrom the Model Business CorporationAct, 67 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1201, 1203 (1999).

15. Allen, Jacobs, & Strine, supra note 4, at 451-58; Smith, supra note 14, at 1202-05.
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tempt to examine and assess the justifications for maintaining a divergence in that context.
Neither of these two articles provides anything approaching a complete analysis of the divergence question in corporate law. The Phillips article addresses a broad range of corporate governance topics
that were raised by the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project, and devotes only two pages to the normative issues
raised by the divergence of standards of conduct and review. 16 Eisenberg's 1993 article does focus exclusively upon the divergence phenomena. However, he places primary emphasis on describing the extent to
which the divergence between standards of conduct and review permeate virtually all of corporate law, and only devotes a relatively short
section of his article to explaining and justifying this pervasive
7
divergence.I
Eisenberg's normative arguments are essentially a summary restatement and uncritical extension of some of the arguments originally presented by Dan-Cohen who addressed these questions in much
greater depth and breadth. However, as previously noted Dan-Cohen's analysis of the relationship between standards of conduct and
review was expressly limited by the author to criminal law questions.18 The analysis primarily considered the particular situations
where judges apply duress, excuse, and other mitigating doctrines
that favor the accused person in instances where the availability of
those mitigating doctrines is not apparent from the language of the
applicable standards of conduct.19 As I will discuss below, it is very
problematic whether Dan-Cohen's arguments, whatever their merits
in the criminal law context for which they were advanced, have any
application at all in the corporate law context.
I will proceed by first examining in some detail Dan-Cohen's seminal arguments in favor of maintaining the divergence between standards of conduct and review in the criminal law context. I will also
draw upon the comprehensive response to these arguments offered by
Richard Singer. I will then turn to consideration of David Phillips'
normative assessment of divergent standards in the fiduciary duty of
care context, and to Melvin Eisenberg's attempt to marshal and extend Dan-Cohen's arguments to justify maintaining such a divergence
in that context.
16. Phillips, supra note 12, at 667-668.
17. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 461-67 (article in Section VI entitled "Why Standards
of Conduct and Standards of Review Diverge in Corporate Law").
18. Dan-Cohen, supra note 7, at 626. ("I limit both my claims and my illustrations to
the criminal law .... [if the analysis has any application to other fields, this] will
have been an incidental benefit rather than the direct purpose of my
enterprise.").
19. Id. at 636-664.
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Before I begin to address these writers' arguments let me briefly
summarize my conclusions. First, I am in broad agreement with Richard Singer that Dan-Cohen's case for maintaining divergent standards in the criminal law area, while comprehensive, interesting and
having some intuitive appeal, is ultimately unconvincing even in the
restricted context in which it is presented. Second, I conclude that
even if one accepts Dan-Cohen's endorsement of divergent standards
in certain specific criminal law areas when there also exist certain restrictive conditions regarding limited public access to standard of review criteria, those arguments are very context-specific and do not
generalize well over to the corporate fiduciary duty of care context,
where not only the interests of corporate officials, but also the competing interests of other persons such as corporate shareholders, are implicated by having divergent standards. The Phillips article is in full
accord with my conclusions, and while Eisenberg disagrees with me,
his arguments are incomplete and unpersuasive.
My ultimate conclusion is that the case for maintaining divergent
standards of conduct and standards of review in the corporate fiduciary duty of care context has not been made, and that courts and legislatures should therefore no longer endorse this divergence and should
strive to bring the standards of conduct and review into much closer
alignment.
B.

The Dan-Cohen Arguments and the Singer Response
1.

Bentham's Recognition of the Distinction Between Conduct
Rules and Decision Rules

Dan-Cohen begins his analysis by noting that recognition of the
distinction between standards of conduct and standards of review
(which he refers to as "conduct rules"2 0 and "decision rules,"21 respectively, usages that I will respect in the following discussion of his article) can perhaps be traced as far back in history as the Talmud,22 and
certainly at least as far back as Jeremy Bentham. To support this
claim he presents two quotes by Bentham in which that writer first
contrasts the particular conduct rule "'Let no man steal" with the corresponding decision rule "'Let the judge cause whoever is convicted of
stealing to be hanged."' 23 He then states that "'by implication, and
that a necessary one, the [latter] punitory [decision rule] does involve
20. Id. at 627.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 626 n.1.
23. Id. at 626 (quoting J. BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 430 (W. Harrison ed.,

1948)).
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and include the import of the simply imperative law [the former con24
duct rule] to which it is appended.'"
Let me first note that while these quotes demonstrate that Bentham recognizes the distinction between conduct and decision rules,
the contrast he depicts is not really an instance of divergence. The
two rules as stated are entirely consistent with one another as to the
nature of the prohibited conduct. It is clear that Bentham understood-and doubtless endorsed as well-the rather obvious point that
those persons that are charged with enforcing a conduct rule that is
stated in broad, general language are in need of a more detailed articulation of that rule, particularly with regard to the penalties that are
to be imposed for violations, than are the persons subject to that conduct rule who for most purposes need only to know what conduct is
prohibited. However, I do not read Bentham as going beyond endorsing the articulation of consistent conduct and decision rules at different levels of generality for different purposes to also endorse the idea
of having a substantive divergence between the conduct and decision
rules.
I understand Bentham to be merely recognizing that detailed decision rules are generally associated with the existence of consistent but
more broadly stated conduct rules, and that therefore, a single rule
expressed at different levels of generality as needed can usually suffice, both to guide public behavior and official decisions. Dan-Cohen,
however, understands Bentham, by his use of the "necessary implication" phrase quoted above, to be claiming much more than this; that
as a matter of pure logical entailment conduct rules and decision rules
must necessarily be entirely consistent. 25 He then proceeds to criticize this view, that he attributes to Bentham, as an incorrect "reductionist position."26
Dan-Cohen argues that one who takes this reductionist stance and
thereby concludes that conduct rules are necessarily and completely
derived from their associated decision rules "obscures 'the specific
character of law as a means of social control,"27 which may call for
incorporating other considerations into the design of conduct rules beyond the content of their associated decision rules. Those who draw
reductionist inferences in the opposite direction, so to speak, by regarding decision rules as necessarily and completely derived from
their associated conduct rules, are also said to be mistaken in that
24. Dan-Cohen, supra note 7, at 626.
25. Id. at. 627 ("Bentham's account of the distinction, however, supposes too simple a
relation between the two kinds of rules. If we are to generalize from Bentham's
example, we must conclude that the laws addressed to officials . .. necessarily
imply the laws addressed to the general public. .. [this is an incorrect] reductionist position ... .
26. Id.
27. Id. at 627.
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they ignore the fact that the conduct rules by themselves often do not
provide sanctions for their violations, nor even specifically address the
role of the judge in enforcing those conduct rules. 28
Dan-Cohen's critique of a rather strained interpretation of Bentham that seemingly few would embrace is somewhat opaque as to its
purpose in furthering his normative claims. As best as I can follow his
argument, Dan-Cohen's main point is that regarding conduct rules as
merely being logically entailed and abbreviated statements of the
more detailed decision rules overlooks the additional roles those standards of conduct can play, either as moral exhortations intended to
strengthen desirable, extra-legal social norms, or by providing subject
persons with a "cushion of safety" by describing the prohibited conduct
more broadly than the actually enforced limitations, which together
may call for having the conduct rules diverge from the decision rules
in a substantive manner. His second point is apparently the more obvious one: that without additional guidance from other sources, one
cannot logically derive the more detailed decision rules from conduct
rules, nor even establish the basic principle that judges are to enforce
conduct rules.
I certainly concur with Dan-Cohen's criticism of the "necessary implication" interpretation of Bentham's statements, though as I have
noted I do not interpret them in that manner. However, and more
importantly, his entire discussion here is somewhat beside the point
in that it fails to squarely address the real question at issue: granted
that it is possible to have a divergence between conduct rules and decision rules, is it desirable?
2.

The Prerequisiteof Acoustic Separation

Dan-Cohen eventually addresses this question in some detail later
in his article, but in an intervening and important discussion he recognizes as a threshold matter: that the advantages he will later argue
can result from having divergent conduct and decision rules are dependent on there being an "acoustic separation" 29 between those persons subject to the conduct rules and the officials who apply the
decision rules, 30 In other words, it is crucial that the persons subject
to the conduct rules are not made aware that their conduct, if challenged, will in fact be judged by different decision rules. He concedes
that if those persons who are subject to the conduct rules do somehow
become aware of the existence and scope of the different decision rules
that will be applied, they are likely to conform their conduct to the
legally enforced decision rules rather than to the unenforced conduct
28. Id. at 628.
29. Id. at 630.
30. Id.
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rules, and the norm-shaping and other advantages of having divergent rules will be lost.31
This recognition that the argument for having different conduct
and decision rules is predicated upon there being an effective "acoustic
separation" between those persons subject to the conduct rules and
the officials that will apply the decision rules is a very significant concession by Dan-Cohen. It limits his defense of divergent rules to those
unusual circumstances where the persons subject to a conduct rule are
either unaware of the different decision rule, because of vagueness in
the articulation of the conduct rule or for other reasons, or if aware of
it, then unable to understand the different decision rule because the
decision rule is communicated to officials though some form of "selective transmission,"3 2 such as through the vehicle of a specialized, technical vocabulary, that is inaccessible to the persons subject to the
33
conduct rule.
In situations where there exists such "acoustic separation" DanCohen argues that a divergence between conduct rules and decision
rules might better enable the legal system to simultaneously achieve
the two competing goals of, first, effecting deterrence of criminal conduct and, second, providing leniency where appropriate due to special
circumstances, than would having a uniform rule.34 His major illustration offered in support of this claim is the criminal defense excuse
of duress. In his view, a criminal law conduct rule which does not call
attention to the potential availability of a duress defense under certain circumstances will better deter criminal conduct than would a
conduct rule that recognized the duress defense, since the latter formulation might encourage a Holmesian "bad man" 35 to steer his be31. Id. at 632 ("[Tlhe possibility that conduct or decision rules may have such unintended side effects creates the potential for conflict between decision rules and
conduct rules in the absence of acoustic separation. A decision rule conflicts with
a conduct rule if the decision rule conveys, as a side effect, a normative message
that opposes or detracts from the power of the conduct rule. Conversely, a conduct rule conflicts with a decision rule when the messages it sends decision-makers contradict the decision rule. Such conflicting messages are impossible under
conditions of acoustic separation... [under those circumstances] neither group is
in danger of receiving conflicting messages addressed to the other.
32. Id. at 635.
33. Id. at 631-634.
34. Id. at 633 ("The law faces a hopeless trade-off between the competing values of
deterrence and compassion [or fairness]; whichever way it resolves the question
of duress, it must sacrifice one value to the other. The impasse dissolves, however, if we analyze the problem in terms of the distinction between conduct rules
and decision rules .... When we do so, it becomes obvious that the policies
advanced by the [duress] defense would lead to its use as a decision rule ....
Just as obviously, no comparable rule would be included among the conduct rules
35.

See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMEs, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS

167, 169-79 (1920).

680

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:671

havior closer to, or even across, the criminal conduct line. However, a
judge in deciding whether to punish an instance of behavior that violated a criminal conduct rule would obviously want, in the interest of
fairness and mercy, to be able to consider the possibility of more lenient treatment due to the presence of factors sufficient to justify a complete or partial duress defense, so that the elements of the duress
36
defense should be included in the decision rule.
Here we have reached the core of the Dan-Cohen argument in
favor of having divergent rules: when it is possible to "acoustically separate" the messages sent to different classes of persons, so as to avoid
public confusion as to the contours of the applicable rule, it may be
preferable to provide the general public with a relatively strict conduct rule, so as to discourage persons from walking closer to the criminal conduct line in the hope that, if accused, they will be able to
prevail by relying upon various situation-specific excuses and other
defenses, while simultaneously and covertly providing judges with a
more flexible decision rule that will allow them to exercise leniency
when it is called for.
Even if one concedes that such a regime of divergent rules under
conditions of acoustic separation would have certain social benefits, in
that it would simultaneously promote deterrence and yet provide for
leniency where needed, there is obviously a real question as to
whether such a covert and paternalistic approach is a legitimate
means of achieving these objectives. Dan-Cohen clearly recognizes
this problem and addresses the legitimacy issue in some detail in the
latter portion of his article.37 I will address these arguments below,
but I would like to first explain why I believe that the questions of the
merits of these arguments as applied to the corporate law context are
moot.
These questions are mooted because the threshold prerequisite of
effective acoustic separation that Dan-Cohen concedes is necessary
before there is any possibility that a divergence of standards might be
justified is unlikely to ever be present in the corporate law context.
He recognizes that complete acoustic separation is unlikely to ever occur, 3 8 but asserts that various mechanisms of "selective transmission," such as the use of a specialized technical vocabulary not
accessible to the general public to communicate decision rules, may
result in significant "partial acoustic separation" of divergent
messages in some instances in the criminal law context. 3 9 However,
he does not attempt to empirically demonstrate precisely where in our
criminal law framework there exists, due to selective transmission
36.
37.
38.
39.

Dan-Cohen, supra note 7, at 632-33.
Id. at 665-77.
Id. at 631.
Id. at 634-35.
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mechanisms or otherwise, a significant enough degree of acoustical
separation with regard to particular conduct and decision rules to create the possibility of maintaining a divergence between them in order
to achieve his deterrence-plus-leniency objectives. A fortiori, he does
not make any such empirical claims with regard to any corporate law
rules.
One would think that a high degree of acoustical separation would
be a rather rare occurrence. Even in the "street crime" criminal law
context, where the linguistic gulf between potential criminals and
judges is relatively large, indirect social mechanisms operate to communicate the essential content of decision rules to potential criminals
in a language they can understand. In the corporate fiduciary duty
law context significant acoustical separation would seem to be rare
indeed, if not non-existent. Senior corporate officials have excellent
access to the detailed text of the applicable decision rules, as well as
the training, background and, if necessary, legal advice to effectively
understand the import of those decision rules. This high degree of access and capability to understand decision rules also exists, albeit to a
somewhat lesser extent in some instances, for corporate shareholders.
In addition, it would appear that any significant degree of acoustical separation with regard to any conduct rule/decision rule pair
would tend to lessen over time because the subject persons would
learn more about the decision rules from their experiences with judicial enforcement. By comparing the judicial rulings with their ex ante
conduct rule-based expectations, and noting the regular and systematic inconsistencies between them, they will be put on notice that
some hidden decision criterion is being applied by the decision-makers
and given clues as to the contours of the criterion. 40 As any parent
knows only all too well, even when children are given broad conduct
rules of an absolute "do your homework on time," "be home by 8:00
p.m.," and so forth, they nevertheless very quickly learn to infer the
true contours of the decision rules, and then conform their conduct to
those decision rules rather than to the formally declared conduct
rules. Such children, when they grow up to run corporations, get
much better at ferreting out those decision rules, while remaining adept at inferring from consequences what they do not hear directly.
3.

The Argument for Legitimacy

Let me now turn to the arguments offered by Dan-Cohen in the
closing portion of his article 4 ' wherein he defends the legitimacy of
having divergent conduct and decision rules. He limits his defense to
40. Singer in his response to Dan-Cohen notes this possibility as well. Singer, supra
note 8, at 86.
41. Dan-Cohen, supra note 7, at 665-77.
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circumstances where there is a sufficient degree of acoustical separation to make this a potential approach for simultaneously achieving
2
deterrence while preserving judicial flexibility to provide leniency.4
Dan-Cohen begins his legitimacy analysis from the uncompromising stance that the only divergences between conduct and decision
rules that could conceivably be legitimate are those where the decision rule is more lenient in favor of the accused than is the associated
conduct rule. A decision rule that would impose a punishment for conduct not prohibited by the associated conduct rule is one that inflicts
43
"hidden punishments" and thus is "clearly illegitimate."
I certainly agree that the comparative leniency of decision rules
that differ from their associated conduct rules is a necessary condition
for their legitimacy. However, this position suggests a symmetrical
argument. A decision rule that is more lenient than the associated
conduct rule also imposes hidden punishments in a sense, this time
upon the criminal victim and other members of the general public who
reasonably expect that accused persons will be held to the standards
of the articulated conduct rule rather than only to the standards of a
hidden and more lenient decision rule. Dan-Cohen does not address
this potential problem,44 and my surmise is that he regarded this as
invoking hypothetical consequences too abstract and diffuse to merit
meaningful consideration in a legitimacy inquiry. I believe, however,
that these consequences are more significant than Dan-Cohen recognizes, and Richard Singer is in full accord on this point. 4 5
42. 42. Dan-Cohen in at least two points in his article suggests that he is merely
explaining the divergence of conduct and decision rules, not endorsing it. Id. at
636 ("[Application of this model here is not meant] to endorse the law's attempt to
segregate its normative messages through acoustic separation."); Id. at 677
("[The legitimacy of divergent standards] is ultimately a matter of substantive
moral choice that the analysis presented here can help clarify but cannot resolve."). However, I read the overall thrust of his article as supporting divergence, at least under limited circumstances. In accord is Richard Singer. See
Singer, supra note 8, at 73 ("In my own reading, however, [Dan-Cohen] supports
both selective transmission and acoustic separation, primarily as a means to deter persons from criminal and even near criminal acts.").
43. Dan-Cohen, supra note 7, at 665 n.10.
44. Id. at 671 ("[Wlhen decision rules are more lenient than conduct rules ... no one
is likely to ... complain of frustrated expectations.").
45. Singer takes strong exception to Dan-Cohen's claim that no one would be
prejudiced by criminal law decision rules that are more lenient than the associated conduct rules:
This, however, is surely wrong. The most obvious complainant will be
the victim. While the victim cannot be said to have 'relied' upon the conduct rule, he will surely be annoyed, or worse, when he learns there is no
penalty, or a lesser penalty, attached to the violation of the conduct rule
than he was led to believe. Moreover, those who abstained from those
acts which the decision rules make legal may also complain that they
would have engaged in equally legal behavior.., had they known. Fi-
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Even if one regards decision rules that are more lenient than their
associated conduct rules as potentially legitimate in the criminal law
context, as I will discuss below in connection with Melvin Eisenberg's
article, if one attempts to justify also having divergent conduct and
decision rules in the civil suit context of corporate fiduciary duty law,
one simply must confront the fact that leniency for corporate officials
with regard to their lack of compliance with duty of care conduct rules
necessarily imposes equivalent "hidden punishments" upon an identifiable class of corporate shareholders. It punishes in the very meaningful and concrete sense of abridging their formally articulated
principle-agent duty of care rights. One can only speculate as to
whether Dan-Cohen himself would regard this difference in context as
fatal to efforts to broaden the scope of his legitimacy defense to the
corporate law context, but his strong condemnation of the idea of hidden punishments suggests that he may for this reason regard his defense of divergent rules as strictly limited to the criminal law context.
In his response to Dan-Cohen's article, Richard Singer notes another problematic feature of having decision rules that are more lenient than conduct rules: that those members of the public that are
aware of the decision rules-and there will always be such people in
the absence of complete acoustical separation-will be able to take unfair advantage of this awareness. 46 Another troubling concern is the
reality that professional criminals are more likely to become aware of
and manipulate to their advantage the true and more lenient decision
rules than are the more law-abiding members of the public.47
Let us accept for the moment Dan-Cohen's premise that divergences between conduct rules and decision rules might possibly be justified under some circumstances where the decision rules are more
lenient to the accused person than are the conduct rules. He addresses in some detail the concern that the ideal of the "rule of law"
requires a degree of openness and candor that simply precludes having such divergences.4 8 He considers four arguments that are commonly invoked in favor of understanding the rule of law to require
public and clearly stated pronouncements, and concludes that none of
nally... the offender who is not afforded the leniency will also complain.
(Footnotes omitted)
Singer, supra note 8, at 99.
46. Id. at 85.
47. Id. at 86-87.
48. Dan-Cohen, supra note 7, at 667 ("[Tlhe ideal of the rule of law expresses an
ethos of law as an area of public life particularly committed to the values of openness and candor. Central to the rule of law is the requirement that the laws be
clearly stated and publicly proclaimed. The alarm likely to follow the realization
that selective transmission may circumvent these requirements accordingly
seems well founded.").
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these arguments necessarily preclude having a divergence between
9
conduct and decision rules.4
He first recognizes that the rule of law serves to limit the possibility for arbitrary actions by government officials, but reasons that a
divergence between conduct and decision rules does not undercut
these limitations because the effectiveness of decision rules to serve
this purpose "does not depend on broad dissemination or easy accessibility of those rules to the general public." 50 However, the rather obvious response is that this may not be the case-that a reduction in the
visibility of decision rules might well serve to reduce the accountability of legal decision-makers to the public. Dan-Cohen simply does not
address this objection.
Second, he notes that conformity to the openness premise of the
rule of law is often claimed to generally increase the efficacy of the law
in achieving whatever goals are sought through legal means. 5 1 His
response to this is to assert that selective transmission of decision
rules to a limited audience and their concealment from public view,
may in fact "best serve the purposes of the law" in instances where
publicity and clarity "impede its usefulness." 52 He is apparently referring again to the norm-bolstering/cushion of safety/judicial flexibility
advantages that he believes may result from divergence, and which
may upon occasion outweigh the costs of departing from rule of law
principles. When his claim is stated in these very general terms, I
simply find it impossible to evaluate.
Third, he responds to a commonly offered utilitarian'justification
in defense of the publicity and clarity of the rule of law that calls for a
complete dissemination of all decision rules to the public. 5 3 He finds
the sweeping proposition unfounded, reasoning that under some circumstances, it is possible that for an individual the greater publicity
and clarity of the law "would indeed serve the individual's goals but
diminish rather than promote social utility."54 Unfortunately, absent
a definition of some metric by which to assess the overall utilitarian
consequences of various degrees of publicity and clarity of particular
laws it is also impossible to evaluate this claim. Perhaps this is an
area where he could have again turned to Bentham-the original utilitarian!-for some assistance!
Finally, Dan-Cohen addresses the argument that the rule of law is
necessary to provide the predictability and security necessary for peo49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 667-73.
at 668.

at 669.
at 669-70.
Id. at 670.
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ple to live autonomously and plan their affairs effectively.55 After
some extended discussion of this argument he concludes that divergence between conduct rules and decision rules is not a problem in
this regard because conduct rules are all that need to be publicized to
achieve these goals, and public knowledge of the decision rules is not
necessary. 5 6 However, the argument that conduct rules more restrictive than their associated decision rules do not limit personal autonomy is unconvincing.5 7 He again concedes here that his conclusion is
only valid when the decision rules are more lenient than their associated conduct rules,58 which, as noted above, sharply undercuts efforts
to generalize his normative arguments to the corporate law civil suit
context.
As my comments above indicate, I find incomplete and problematic
his effort to accommodate a divergence between conduct and decision
rules with the openness, clarity and autonomy values implicit in a
commitment to the rule of law. 5 9 Even if one finds these arguments
convincing, it is important to note that Dan-Cohen concludes this part
of his analysis with the very modest claim that while he has now
demonstrated that the traditional "rule of law" openness and clarity
concerns do not alone render a divergence between conduct and decision rules illegitimate, he has not yet affirmatively justified engaging
in this practice.6O
In the last portion of his article Dan-Cohen presents his final, affirmative justification for divergence between conduct and decision
rules. He articulates a broad and open-ended rationale that calls for
situating the legitimacy inquiry within a larger and more realistic
context that gives proper weight to the "brutality" implicit in criminal
punishment.61 In doing so, he rejects being unduly fastidious about
the legal means utilized because, as he states, just as is often the case
in political affairs, sometimes the only way to use the law to achieve a
noble end involves accepting the burden of "dirty hands" that results
from the use of surreptitious and distasteful but necessary measures.6 2 From this perspective, while partially sacrificing the rule of
law values of publicity and honesty may result from the maintenance
55. Id. at 670-71.
56. Id. at 670-73.
57. Singer, supra note 8, at 98 ("For those for whom autonomy is a precious right,
even when that autonomy comes close to criminality, the bark-bite philosophy
espoused by Professor Dan-Cohen is on shaky ground.").
58. Dan-Cohen, supra note 7, at 671 ("The need for security of individual expectations is not a great obstacle to the use of selective transmission when decision
rules are more lenient than conduct rules lead people to expect.").
59. Singer is in full accord. Singer, supra note 8, at 100.("In summary, the argument
for acoustical separation.., fails on both utilitarian and normative grounds.").
60. Dan-Cohen, supra note 7, at 673.
61. Id. at 674.
62. Id. at 676-77.
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of divergent conduct and decision rules in a particular instance, the
sacrifice may be justified when needed to prevent human suffering,
whether in the form of preventable crimes or excessive criminal
63
punishment.
This would be a difficult argument to evaluate even with regard to
a very specific conduct rule/decision rule pair, let alone in general
terms. I will not attempt to respond directly, but will simply point out
that much of its force stems from the empathy one naturally feels for
those burdened by unnecessary criminal victimization due to insufficient deterrence of crime, or for those burdened by excessive criminal
punishment due to limited judicial flexibility that impedes granting
proper leniency. Both of which are absent in the civil suit corporate
law context.
In overall summary, Dan-Cohen's normative objective in his article
is actually quite carefully limited. He attempts to only justify the divergence between conduct rules and decision rules in certain special
situations arising in the criminal law context, and only under circumstances of significant acoustical separation between the different classes of persons to whom the conduct and decision rules are selectively
communicated, and even then, only where the decision rules are more
lenient for the subject persons than are the conduct rules. As noted in
the Introduction, my overall conclusion is that even within this limited context Dan-Cohen has not successfully made the case for maintaining a divergence between conduct and decision rules.
If, however, one disagrees with both Richard Singer and myself
and believes that Dan-Cohen has presented a convincing argument
justifying a divergence between conduct and decision rules under the
narrowly circumscribed conditions he sets out to address, then the
question is posed as to whether his arguments can be extended to justify a comparable divergence between the standards of conduct and
standards of review in the corporate fiduciary of care context. David
Phillips concludes that they cannot, but Melvin Eisenberg attempts to
make the case that these arguments do successfully apply in this context. To these articles I will now turn.
C.

The Phillips and Eisenberg Arguments Regarding
Whether Divergent Standards Are Justified in the
Corporate Fiduciary Duty of Care Context

As noted above in the Introduction, the Richard Phillips article" addresses a number of questions raised by the American Law Institute's
1984 Principles of Corporate Governance document 64 and only devotes
63. Id. at 677.

64.

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Ten-

tative Draft No. 3, 1984) [hereinafter 1984 Principles].
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a short discussion to duty of care issues. In that discussion he notes a
discrepancy between the Section 4.01 formulation of the fiduciary
duty of care proposed by the 1984 Principles and the business judgment rule jurisprudence, recognizing that this discrepancy can be
characterized as a divergent conduct rule/decision rule pair under
Dan-Cohen's conceptual framework.6 5 He initially appears to embrace in very general terms Dan-Cohen's argument justifying divergence, concluding that while divergence "may indeed be appropriate in
certain contexts to accomplish equity or to foster other values and policies," 66 such divergence should be characterized by decision rules
that are more lenient regarding the behavior of the persons subject to
them than are their associated decision rules.67 However, when he
applies those arguments to the corporate duty of care context he very
quickly concludes that "one would be hard pressed to defend" maintaining divergence in that context because of the unlikely prospect of
there being the significant acoustical separation necessary to achieve
the aims sought by Dan-Cohen. 68 In his view, the only persons likely
to be significantly affected by such a divergence would be some fraction of the less sophisticated "noninstitutional shareholders," who
might be thereby mislead as to the extent of director liability for duty
of care violations. 6 9 He concludes that divergence in this area of law
is undesirable and serves to "undermine the utility of the duty-of-care
7
doctrine." 0
Melvin Eisenberg's 1993 article is devoted primarily to describing
in some detail the pervasiveness of divergence between standards of
conduct and review in corporate law. He also includes a section addressing, to a limited extent, the normative questions raised by the
divergence, although in a much more abbreviated fashion than the
more descriptive portions of the article. 7 1
Essentially, Eisenberg's approach to these normative issues is to
briefly summarize a few of the justification arguments made by DanCohen in his article, and then to broadly and summarily generalize
those arguments to the corporate law context. He initially draws upon
Dan-Cohen's discussion of Bentham's writings, once again to make the
simple point that it is logically possible to have a divergence between
standards of conduct and standards of review. 72 He then introduces
Dan-Cohen's concept of acoustic separation, noting as did Dan-Cohen
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Phillips, supra note 12, at 667.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 667-68.
Id. at 668.
Id.
Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 461-67.
Id. at 462.
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that conditions of partial acoustic separation create the opportunity to
achieve important social goals through use of divergent standards.73
Eisenberg then turns to the question of whether standards of conduct can be regarded as meaningful legal rules when they differ from
their associated standards of review. Recall that Dan Cohen's position
here was that conduct rules that differ from decision rules are nevertheless potentially significant because of their norm-shaping effects,
and because of the "cushion of safety" that they provide for the public
by imposing broader limitations on conduct than do their associated
decision rules. Eisenberg, however, goes much further than this limited claim made by Dan-Cohen and flatly declares that "standards of
conduct have a real bite." 74 Apparently this is so without regard to
the degree of acoustical separation that may be present, because in
Eisenberg's opinion many corporate directors and officers will nevertheless conform their behavior to the standards of conduct, rather
than to the standards of review. Why will they do this? Eisenberg
offers two complementary explanations.
First, Eisenberg explains that many corporate directors and officers will do so out of prudence, because "a director or officer who
relies only on a standard of review that is less demanding than the
parallel standard of conduct is at risk that the standard of review will
be deemed inapplicable and liability will be imposed under the standard of conduct."7 5 I believe that Eisenberg is here mistaken.
A director who conforms to the standard of conduct because he perceives that if his conduct is challenged the standard of conduct rather
than the "normal" standard of review criteria may be applied is still
conforming his conduct to the standard of review as he perceives it to
be, rather than to the standard of conduct itself. He is simply recognizing that the standard of review is an uncertain standard that may
under some circumstances be applied so as to impose the tougher
standard of conduct criteria rather than the "usual" and more forgiving standard of review criteria. Put another way, it is not that standards of conduct have a real "bite," but rather that uncertain and
variable standards of review are likely to result in behavior that skirts
their expected outer limits, which may coincidentally be the limits of
the standard of conduct. The point is that it is still the standard of
review that is compelling conformity, not the standard of conduct.
Eisenberg's second explanation for claiming that standards of conduct are meaningful legal rules is that they "also serve as a foundation
for private standards of conduct." 76 According to Eisenberg the legal
advice given to corporate clients, and the private codes of conduct
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 462-463.
Id. at 464.
Id.
Id.
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adopted by corporations and circulated to their employees, are generally based upon the standards of conduct and not the standards of review. 7 7 Eisenberg simply asserts this to be the case without offering
any empirical support, and without explaining why one would expect
this to be so in the absence of significant acoustical separation that
worked to deny lawyers and corporate code-drafters access to the standards of review. Nor does he offer a rationale as to why corporate decision-makers would then choose to conform their conduct to these
aspirational codes or to this excessively conservative legal advice if
they were aware of the actual decision rules. If these claims are true
it would have the important consequence of justifying divergence even
absent significant acoustical separation. Such counter-intuitive
claims must be demonstrated rather than merely asserted.
For the sake of argument, let us accept for the moment Eisenberg's
claim that standards of conduct that diverge from their associated
standards of review may meaningfully affect behavior, even in the absence of significant acoustical separation. The important normative
question that Dan-Cohen wrestled with extensively is thus again
squarely presented: is it desirable that we have this divergence?
What social benefits are thereby obtained, what social costs are imposed, and is this approach a legitimate means of obtaining those net
social benefits?
Unfortunately, Eisenberg's normative case is far less developed
than was Dan-Cohen's, and simply overlooks the major issues while
addressing more tangential concerns. For example, he devotes considerable discussion to defending the claim that actors who are engaged
in primary conduct are in need of relatively simple and easily communicated standards of conduct, while the standards of review are directed primarily at judges and therefore can be formulated in a much
more complex and detailed manner.7 8 This is certainly true, but it
only provides justification for having consistent standards of conduct
and standards of review expressed at different levels of generality to
different publics, not for having a divergence between the substantive
criteria imposed. He also notes in this discussion that articulations of
the standards to different publics at different degrees of complexity
may create a partial acoustic separation which will magnify the impact of divergent standards, but again does not attempt to justify in
the first instance imposing such impacts. 79
The closest Eisenberg ever comes to offering a normative justification for divergence is when he states that "we are now brought to the
question, what accounts for the pervasive divergence." 8 0 Eisenberg
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id. at 466.
Id. at 467.
Id. at 464.
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then answers his own question in the duty of care context by stating
that "the law wants to send directors and officers a two-part message[:]"81 that corporate officials should act with due care, but that
they will be held liable only if they behave in a grossly negligent manner. Eisenberg's "answer" merely restates the existence of a divergence without either explaining or justifying its presence.
Eisenberg fails to address the central legitimacy and the extent of
acoustical separation questions that need to be faced in defending the
use of divergent standards of conduct and review in the corporate law
context. In all fairness, providing a normative defense of divergent
standards was apparently not the primary purpose of his article,
which focuses much more on simply describing the pervasiveness of
the practice in corporate law. In addition, the portion of his article
that contains what little there is by way of a normative discussion was
given the explanatory oriented title "Why Standards of Conduct and
Standards of Review Diverge in Corporate Law," and not a more justification-oriented title such as: "Is it a Good Idea that the Standards of
Conduct and Review Diverge in Corporate Law?" Nevertheless, given
that Eisenberg is implicitly joining the normative controversy through
his extensive and approving citation of the Dan-Cohen normative arguments, it would seem appropriate for him to have gone a bit further
and taken a position on each of Dan-Cohen's major normative claims,
particularly since as I have attempted to demonstrate they are highly
contestable claims. He at the least should have devoted some effort to
address the difficult additional issues raised when one attempts to apply the Dan-Cohen criminal law-oriented normative arguments to the
corporate law context, as did Phillips in his earlier and much more
critical work.82
Eisenberg has fallen well short of providing a convincing justification for maintaining divergent standards of conduct and review in the
duty of care area, although again it must be recognized that this was
apparently not his primary intention. A more serious attempt at such
a justification would have to first of all clearly identify the social benefits that are claimed to result from having divergent standards. If one
favors divergence because it bolsters social norms, provides a cushion
of safety for persons, and provides scope for needed judicial leniency
for violators a la Dan-Cohen, one would then need to address the special difficulty that in the corporate fiduciary duty of care context leniency for violators is a zero-sum affair that equals equivalent loss of
protections for shareholders. If there are additional social benefits of
divergence in the corporate fiduciary duty of care context beyond those
described by Dan-Cohen as arising in the criminal law context, these
benefits need to be identified and, if possible, quantified. Empirical
81. Id. at 465.
82. Phillips, supra note 12, at 667-68.
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evidence would also need to be marshaled, either to demonstrate that
there exists sufficient acoustical separation to make the divergence
approach feasible, or else to support Eisenberg's assertions that standards of conduct will significantly affect the behavior of corporate officials even in the absence of acoustical separation.
Finally, one would have to take a position with regard to all of the
"rule of law" concerns extensively addressed by Dan-Cohen that are
starkly raised by the use of covert and concealed standards of review.
It would be necessary to somehow demonstrate that Dan-Cohen's
grudging endorsement of covert "dirty hands" measures is not only
justified in the criminal law context, but also carries over from the
arena of harsh criminal victimization and punishment to the more refined arena of corporate fiduciary duty violations.
III.

CONCLUSION

My conclusions should by now be apparent to anyone who has had
the patience to read this far. Mier Dan-Cohen has done important
work in comprehensively examining and assessing the justifications
for having divergent standards of conduct and review. By limiting his
arguments to the context of criminal law rules promulgated under circumstances where significant acoustic separation exists he has
presented the strongest possible case for maintaining such a divergence. Anyone who reads his article will have to reflect seriously on
whether the deterrence/social norm bolstering/cushion of safety benefits and judicial flexibility benefits that he demonstrates may simultaneously result from having unpublicized standards of review that are
more lenient than the publicized standards of conduct outweigh the
reservations one must have over the legitimacy of this covert and paternalistic approach. Richard Singer in his comprehensive response
article has concluded that Dan-Cohen's arguments are ultimately unpersuasive,8 3 and I agree with him. Reasonable people can certainly
reach different conclusions on this close and difficult question, but in
my view the illegitimacy of utilizing such means in a society committed to the rule of law outweighs those benefits, significant though they
may be in some instances.
The corporate fiduciary duty of care context presents a much more
difficult challenge for advocates of maintaining divergent standards.
Not only does a covert gross negligence standard of review as compared to the articulated negligence standard of conduct accord more
leniency to corporate officials and come at an equivalent cost to corporate shareholders whose protections are correspondingly weakened,
but the requisite acoustic separation necessary to avoid creating confusion is unlikely to exist in the corporate context. For these reasons,
83. Singer, supra note 8, at 100.
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David Phillips concludes that maintaining divergent standards of conduct and review in this area is not justified,84 and I am in complete
agreement with him. Melvin Eisenberg comprehensively documents
the pervasiveness of divergent standards in corporate law, but his article does not add anything of significance to Dan-Cohen's basic normative arguments in favor of maintaining divergent standards beyond
asserting without offering proof that standards of conduct that differ
from standards of review will influence behavior even absent acoustical separation. Nor does he address either of the troubling special
concerns noted above that are raised by attempting to extend those
arguments to the corporate fiduciary duty of care context.
I personally do not believe that those specific feasibility and legitimacy concerns raised by having divergent standards in the corporate
law context can be adequately addressed. There is no meaningful
acoustic separation to work with within this context, there is no evidence that without acoustical separation standards of conduct that
differ from standards of review will have significant behavioral effects,
and the application of covert standards of review which undercut the
articulated shareholder fiduciary duty protections is in my opinion an
unacceptable departure from the rule of law. Even if one accepts DanCohen's arguments for maintaining divergent standards in some instances in the criminal law context, which Richard Singer and I do
not, David Phillips makes clear, and I hope I have made even clearer,
an adequate justification for maintaining divergent standards of conduct and review in the duty of care context still does not exist. This
divergence undercuts the commitment to the rule of law, without any
evidence that it results in significant social benefits. Therefore judicial and legislative actions should be taken to bring the standards of
conduct and review in this area of law into much closer alignment.

84. Phillips, supra note 12, at 668.

